Bromat Holdings Ltd: FY2025 Results — Can This Turnaround Story Survive?

Bromat Holdings Limited (SGX:[ticker]) FY2025 Results — Turnaround Hope vs Harsh Financial Reality

A clear-eyed walkthrough of Bromat’s FY2025 results — collapsing revenue, widening losses and a balance sheet that survives mainly on director support.

Published: 11 November 2025  |  Based on: Bromat Holdings Limited FY2025 results announcement

Key Takeaways (If You Only Have 30 Seconds)

• FY2025 revenue collapsed to about S$0.23 million, down roughly 88% year-on-year as two major outlets closed.
• Net loss deepened to around S$2.88 million (vs about S$0.48 million previously), with no repeat of earlier one-off gains.
• Year-end cash is only about S$25,000, while borrowings are roughly S$4.6 million and equity is around −S$7.0 million.
• The business is burning cash — about S$2.03 million net used in operating activities — and funded largely by new loans and advances.
• Survival depends heavily on ongoing financial support from director-investor Frank Liu Tao, including high-interest and interest-free loans.
• The proposed Dining Haus disposal remains unresolved; a statutory demand has been issued to recover about S$1.0 million of consideration.
• For most retail investors, this currently looks more like a high-risk special situation than a conventional F&B investment.

Contents

• 1. Big Picture — What Is Bromat Today?
• 2. Revenue — Why Did Sales Collapse?
• 3. Margins & Losses — Why Are Losses So Large?
• 4. Profitability — One-Off Gains, Structural Losses
• 5. Balance Sheet & Debt — Negative Equity, Heavy Leverage
• 6. Cash Flow — Burning Cash to Stay Alive
• 7. Segment Performance — Restaurants vs Institutional Catering
• 8. Dining Haus Disposal & Going Concern
• 9. Financial Snapshot & Risk Profile
• 10. Visual Snapshot (Chart Placeholder)
• 11. FAQ — Common Questions for SGX Investors
• 12. My Overall Take as an Accounting-Trained Investor

Quick Facts (At a Glance)

• Company: Bromat Holdings Limited
• Ticker: SGX:[ticker]
• Period: FY2025 (latest full-year results)
• Business focus: F&B restaurant operations (e.g. Shang Society) plus legacy institutional catering (Dining Haus)
• History: Successor to the troubled No Signboard business, still working through legacy liabilities and restructuring.
• Key financial markers: Revenue ~S$0.23m, net loss ~S$2.88m, cash ~S$25k, negative equity ~S$7.0m.
• Sources: FY2025 annual results announcement and accompanying notes (company disclosures).

1. Big Picture — What Is Bromat Today?

Bromat Holdings Limited (SGX:[ticker]) released FY2025 results that look more like a patient in intensive care than a company in steady recovery. Revenue has collapsed, losses have widened, cash is almost fully consumed, and the Group remains in a negative equity position.

Over the year, Bromat:

• Closed two outlets — Little Sheep Hotpot and nosignboard Shen Jian — in September 2024.
• Opened a new restaurant concept, Shang Society, in January 2025.
• Continued to restructure legacy liabilities from the former No Signboard business.

On paper, Bromat now runs one main outlet plus a small institutional catering business (classified as discontinued operations). The rest of the balance sheet is dominated by payables, loans from the director, and restructuring-related items.

2. Revenue — Why Did Sales Collapse?

FY2025 revenue slumped to around S$232,000, compared with approximately S$1.92 million in the prior year — a decline in the range of 87–90%.

The main reasons are straightforward:

• Outlet closures: Little Sheep Hotpot and nosignboard Shen Jian ceased operations in September 2024. Their revenue dropped to zero overnight.
• New outlet still small: Shang Society only commenced operations in January 2025 and is still ramping up, contributing modest sales.

In effect, Bromat is attempting to rebuild from a far smaller base, with no evidence yet of a scalable concept that can replace the lost outlets.

Explaining it like you’re 11:

Imagine you used to run three stalls in the school canteen. Two of them were closed, and you opened one small new stall that hasn’t become popular yet. Of course your total pocket money from selling food will crash — that’s what happened to Bromat’s revenue this year.

Analyst insight:

• This is not a small dip — it is a near-total collapse of the revenue base.
• The Group has not yet proven that Shang Society or any new concept can restore scale.
• At such low turnover, even well-managed F&B outlets would struggle to cover fixed overheads.
• Until revenue recovers meaningfully, turnaround discussions are largely theoretical.

3. Margins & Losses — Why Are Losses So Large?

With revenue shrinking so dramatically, fixed costs now sit on a very small top line. The result is a much larger net loss of about S$2.88 million, versus roughly S$0.48 million in FY2024.

The widening loss reflects:

• Fixed rentals and overheads spread over minimal sales.
• New depreciation from Shang Society’s leasehold improvements and equipment.
• Higher finance costs from increased borrowings.
• Ongoing restructuring and professional costs linked to legacy issues.

Explaining it like you’re 11:

Think of renting a big shop to sell snacks. Even if you only sell one or two snacks a day, the landlord still wants full rent, and you still pay your staff. That’s what Bromat is facing — big bills every month, but not enough customers to pay for them.

Analyst insight:

• The current cost structure is not aligned with the tiny revenue base.
• Without outlet-level profitability at Shang Society, group-level break-even is unrealistic.
• Even aggressive cost-cutting cannot compensate for such low sales — the business needs volume, not just savings.
• In this context, margin analysis is less about fine-tuning and more about basic viability.

4. Profitability — One-Off Gains vs Structural Losses

Part of the year-on-year swing in bottom-line performance comes from the absence of prior one-off gains:

• FY2024 included a one-time gain of about S$1.5 million from the write-off of payables — effectively a non-recurring boost.
• FY2025 has no similar one-off benefit, so the underlying operating weakness is fully visible.

When we adjust for these effects, Bromat still appears to be structurally loss-making at the current scale, even before interest and exceptional items.

Explaining it like you’re 11:

Last year, Bromat’s results looked a bit better because some old bills were cancelled, like a teacher suddenly saying, “You don’t need to pay this fine anymore.” This year, there was no such lucky surprise, so we see the real situation — the business itself is still losing money.

Analyst insight:

• FY2024’s gain from payables write-off was financial engineering, not operating strength.
• FY2025 confirms that, absent such one-offs, the core F&B operations remain loss-making.
• Investors should focus on the run-rate loss from continuing operations, not just reported net profit/loss including exceptional items.
• For a turnaround to be credible, outlet-level and group-level profitability must improve independently of accounting adjustments.

5. Balance Sheet & Debt — Negative Equity, Heavy Leverage

The balance sheet is the biggest red flag in Bromat’s story:

• Negative equity: Shareholders’ funds are approximately −S$7.0 million — total liabilities exceed total assets.
• Cash: Only about S$25,000 cash and bank balances at year end.
• Borrowings: Around S$4.6 million in total borrowings, mostly short-term.
• Trade and other payables: Approximately S$3.8 million, including legacy obligations.
• Director advances and loans: Around S$1.57 million of advances plus a S$600,000 loan at 15% p.a. and an US$400,000 interest-free loan from director Frank Liu Tao.

From an accounting perspective, this is a technically insolvent entity whose continued operation depends on creditors — especially the director — choosing not to pull the plug.

Explaining it like you’re 11:

Imagine you owe your friends S$70, but all the things you own — your toys, your phone, your savings — are only worth S$30. And you only have S$25 of cash in your wallet. That’s roughly Bromat’s situation: it owes much more than it owns.

Analyst insight:

• Negative equity and minimal cash mean very little margin for error.
• Short-term loans and payables create refinancing and liquidity risk.
• High-cost debt (e.g. 15% p.a. loan) adds further drag to already weak earnings.
• Without a substantial recapitalisation (fresh equity and debt rationalisation), the capital structure is not sustainable.

6. Cash Flow — Burning Cash to Stay Alive

The statement of cash flows confirms what the income statement and balance sheet already hint at:

• Net cash used in operating activities: about S$2.03 million outflow.
• Net cash used in investing activities: roughly S$53,000 (e.g. for equipment and improvements).
• Net cash from financing activities: approximately S$1.81 million inflow, mainly from new loans and advances.

After all this, cash at bank is only around S$25,000. In other words, the business is still burning cash and is being kept going by financing inflows rather than operating strength.

Explaining it like you’re 11:

Imagine you spend S$20 every week but only earn S$2 from your part-time job. To keep going, you have to keep borrowing from your parents. That’s Bromat right now — it spends more cash running the business than it brings in, and the gap is filled by loans.

Analyst insight:

• This is a classic case of negative operating cash flow funded by financing.
• Unless operations move towards cash break-even, each new loan simply pushes the problem into the future.
• Working capital, capex and financing must all be rethought if the business is to stop consuming cash.
• For now, cash flow signals distress, not an early-stage recovery.

7. Segment Performance — Restaurants vs Institutional Catering

7.1 Continuing Operations — Restaurants (Including Shang Society)

Continuing operations consist mainly of the restaurant business, including Shang Society. These operations:

• Generated the small revenue figure (~S$232k) in FY2025.
• Contributed the bulk of the Group’s loss for the year.
• Have not yet demonstrated sustainable outlet-level profitability.

At this scale, restaurant EBIT and EBITDA are deeply negative. The new concept is unproven and too small to carry corporate overheads.

7.2 Discontinued Operations — Institutional Catering (Dining Haus)

The institutional catering business is classified as discontinued operations. It:

• Recorded a small profit of around S$39,000 at the operating level.
• Was impacted by an impairment loss on the investment in the catering entity.
• Is subject to a delayed disposal with ongoing legal and collection risk (discussed further below).

While the catering unit itself is not the main source of losses, the uncertainty around its disposal adds complexity to the overall picture.

Explaining it like you’re 11:

Think of Bromat as running a small restaurant and also helping cook food for schools or companies. The restaurant is losing money, while the catering job makes a tiny profit. But the catering side is being sold, and the buyer hasn’t paid up yet — like someone taking your toy and not paying you the promised money.

Analyst insight:

• The continuing operations (restaurants) are the real problem — they generate losses with little scale.
• Discontinued operations show some operational ability, but are entangled in disposal and legal issues.
• Even if the catering disposal is ultimately resolved, it does not fix the core restaurant economics.
• Investors should assess whether any segment has demonstrated a repeatable, profitable model — so far, the answer is “not yet”.

8. Dining Haus Disposal & Going Concern — One Individual Holding It Together

A key corporate development is the attempted disposal of the institutional catering subsidiary, Dining Haus:

• April 2025: Agreement to sell Dining Haus for S$1.2 million.
• August 2025: Consideration revised to S$1.0 million.
• September 2025: Shareholders approved the disposal.
• Subsequently: Purchaser failed to complete; Bromat issued a statutory demand to recover the S$1.0 million plus interest and costs.

As at results time, the recoverability of this S$1.0 million remains uncertain — a significant amount relative to the Group’s size.

On top of that, both directors and auditors emphasise that the Group is a going concern only because of the continuing financial support of director-investor Mr Frank Liu Tao, who has:

• Extended multiple loans and advances (including the S$600k 15% p.a. loan and US$400k interest-free loan).
• Committed to provide at least S$3 million of fresh funding by a specified date.

If this support is withdrawn, delayed or reduced, Bromat may not be able to continue as a going concern.

9. Financial Snapshot & Risk Profile (Qualitative)

Rather than precise ratios, it is more useful here to look at directional indicators that summarise Bromat’s position:

Metric	Previous Year	FY2025	Trend / Comment
Revenue scale	~S$1.92m	~S$0.23m	↓↓ Collapsed after outlet closures
Net profit / (loss)	~−S$0.48m (with one-off gain)	~−S$2.88m	↓ Losses widened sharply
Equity	Negative	~−S$7.0m	↓↓ Deeply negative; technically insolvent
Cash balance	Low	~S$25k	↓↓ Essentially no buffer
Net operating cash flow	Negative	~−S$2.03m	↓ Continues to burn cash
Funding reliance	High	Very high (director-dependent)	→ Single point of failure: director support

Note: Figures are rounded and for educational purposes only. Always refer to the official financial statements for precise numbers.

10. FAQ — Common Questions for SGX Investors

Q1. Is Bromat Holdings still considered a going concern?

Yes — but only because of explicit financial support and guarantees from director Frank Liu Tao. Without his loans, advances and funding commitment, the Group would likely not meet going concern criteria given its negative equity and limited cash.

Q2. Why did revenue fall so sharply in FY2025?

Revenue declined mainly due to the closure of two major outlets in September 2024. The remaining outlet, Shang Society, started in January 2025 and is still ramping up, so it cannot yet offset the lost sales from the closed restaurants.

Q3. Has the sale of Dining Haus been completed?

No. The purchaser failed to complete the transaction for the revised S$1.0 million consideration. Bromat has issued a statutory demand to recover this amount plus interest and legal costs. The ultimate outcome and recoverability remain uncertain.

Q4. Is there a risk of share dilution?

Yes. The conversion of convertible redeemable preference shares (CRPS) has already increased the share base. Given the negative equity and ongoing cash burn, additional equity fundraising is likely if the Group attempts a full recapitalisation — which would dilute existing shareholders.

Q5. Does Bromat pay dividends?

No. With loss-making operations, negative equity and heavy reliance on external funding, there are no dividends and none should be expected in the near term. This is not a dividend or income stock at this stage.

11. My Overall Take as an Accounting-Trained Investor

If I had to explain Bromat’s FY2025 results to my 11-year-old, I would say:

“This company used to run a few food stalls. Most of them closed, and the new one isn’t making money yet. It owes a lot of people money and has almost no cash. One rich uncle is lending it money and promising more. If he stops helping, the company might not survive.”

From a more technical lens, here is how I see Bromat today:

• Business quality: The current restaurant operations are sub-scale and unproven; there is no demonstrated, scalable profit engine yet.
• Earnings quality: Prior year results were flattered by one-off gains; FY2025 exposes the true structural losses.
• Balance sheet: Deeply negative equity, minimal cash and heavy reliance on short-term director and third-party funding.
• Risk profile: High insolvency risk, high funding concentration risk and significant execution risk in any turnaround.
• Potential upside: A successful recapitalisation, recovery of Dining Haus proceeds and proven outlet-level profitability could change the story — but these are not in place yet.

For the vast majority of retail investors looking for stable compounding, dividends or even moderate-risk growth, I would categorise Bromat as a “watch, don’t own” situation for now. It sits more in the realm of special situations and distressed investing — suitable only for those who specialise in such cases and are comfortable with the possibility of permanent capital loss.

If you find this style of “explain the numbers like you’re 11” helpful, you can explore more SGX company breakdowns on my Companies A–Z page, or see how I think about accounting and valuation on the Start Here page.

This is not a recommendation to buy or sell Bromat. My aim is to help you read the accounts clearly and decide, with eyes open, whether this kind of risk fits your own portfolio and temperament.

About the author

HenryT is a Fellow Chartered Accountant (FCA) based in Singapore and the writer behind The Accounting Investor. He combines professional accounting training, corporate finance experience and personal dividend investing to help everyday investors read financial statements with confidence.

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Disclaimer

This article is for education and general information only. It does not constitute investment, legal, tax or any other form of professional advice, and it is not a recommendation to buy, sell or hold any securities mentioned.

My sole intent is to help readers learn how to read financial statements and think more clearly about businesses. Please do your own research or consult a licensed financial adviser before making any investment decisions. I may or may not hold positions in the securities discussed at the time of writing and am under no obligation to update this article.